Name / Position

TAKAHASHI, Satoru / Professor





Curriculum Vitae


Professional Experience

Research Field

Game theory

Research Theme

I am interested in various topics in game theory, but my main focus is repeated games and incomplete information games. Recently, together with my coauthors, I have been working on information design, i.e., how (not) to provide information to players in order to induce them to take “socially desirable” actions.



  • “Robust Equilibrium Outcomes in Sequential Games under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs” (with Olivier Tercieux). Journal of Economic Theory, 188, July 2020, 105068.

  • “Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Econometrica 88 (2), March 2020, pp. 693-726.

  • “Non-Equivalence between All and Canonical Elaborations.” Japanese Economic Review 71, January 2020, pp. 43-57. JER Best Article Award.

  • “Rationalizable Strategies in Random Games” (with Ting Pei). Games and Economic Behavior 118, November 2019, pp. 110-125.

  • “Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability” (with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris). Journal of Economic Theory 168, March 2017, pp. 329-371.

  • “How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games?” (with Johannes Hörner). Journal of Economic Theory 165, September 2016, pp. 332-359.

  • “Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games” (with Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Vieille). Econometrica 83 (5), September 2015, pp. 1795-1848.

  • “Contagion and Uninvadability in Local Interaction Games: The Bilingual Game and General Supermodular Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Journal of Economic Theory 157, May 2015, pp. 100-127.

  • “The Robust Selection of Rationalizability” (with Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong). Journal of Economic Theory 151, May 2014, pp. 448-475.

  • “On the Limit Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games” (with Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Vieille). Games and Economic Behavior 85, May 2014, pp. 70-83.

  • “Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring” (with Takuo Sugaya). Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5), September 2013, pp. 1891-1928.

  • “On the Surjectivity of the Mapping between Utilities and Choice Probabilities” (with Andriy Norets). Quantitative Economics 4 (1), March 2013, pp. 149-155 (Notes and Comments).

  • “A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting” (with Bo Chen). Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2), November 2012, pp. 571-581.

  • “Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types” (with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris). American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 102 (3), May 2012, pp. 319-324.

  • “Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs” (with Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux). Japanese Economic Review 63 (1), March 2012, pp. 57-67.

  • “On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (6), December 2011, pp. 683-688.

  • “Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Binary Supermodular Games” (with Daisuke Oyama and Josef Hofbauer). International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (3), September 2011, pp. 251-267.

  • “Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ->1 and a Folk Theorem” (with Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, and Nicolas Vieille). Econometrica 79 (4), July 2011, pp. 1277-1318.

  • “Robustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated Games” (with Sylvain Chassang). Theoretical Economics 6 (1), January 2011, pp. 49-93.

  • “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Interaction in Stochastic Fictitious Play” (with Drew Fudenberg). Games and Economic Behavior 71 (1), January 2011, pp. 100-120.

  • “Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play.” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), January 2010, pp. 42-62.

  • “Monotone and Local Potential Maximizers in Symmetric 3x3 Supermodular Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Economics Bulletin 29 (3), August 2009, pp. 2096-2108.

  • “p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics” (with Fuhito Kojima). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67 (3-4), September 2008, pp. 689-701.

  • “Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics” (with Daisuke Oyama and Josef Hofbauer). Theoretical Economics 3 (2), June 2008, pp. 155-192.

  • “The Number of Pure Nash Equilibria in a Random Game with Nondecreasing Best Responses.” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1), May 2008, pp. 328-340.

  • “Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Games with Linear Incentives and Time Symmetry.” International Journal of Game Theory 37 (1), April 2008, pp. 15-38.

  • “Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces” (with Attila Ambrus). Theoretical Economics 3 (1), March 2008, pp. 1-27.

  • “Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability” (with Fuhito Kojima). International Game Theory Review 9 (4), December 2007, pp. 667-688.

  • “Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient” (with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine). Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1), October 2007, pp. 27-49.

  • “Infinite Horizon Common Interest Games with Perfect Information.” Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2), November 2005, pp. 231-247.

  • “Improvement Dynamics in Games with Strategic Complementarities” (with Nikolai S. Kukushkin and Tetsuo Yamamori). International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2), June 2005, pp. 229-238.

  • “On Asynchronously Repeated Games” (with Quan Wen). Economics Letters 79 (2), May 2003, pp. 239- 245.

  • “The Pure Nash Equilibrium Property and the Quasi-Acyclic Condition” (with Tetsuo Yamamori). Economics Bulletin 3 (22), October 2002, pp. 1-6.

Other Professional Activities and Awards