Name / Position
KOJIMA, Fuhito / Professor
*Please replace [at] with@
|2008||Ph. D. in Economics, Harvard University|
|2003||B.A. Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo|
|2020||Professor, Department of Economics, University of Tokyo|
|2019||Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University|
|2013||Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University|
|2011||Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Columbia University|
|2009||Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University|
|2008||Postdoctoral Associate, Cowles Foundation, Yale University|
Market Design, Matching Theory, Game Theory
Kojima's research interests are matching theory and market design. He studies how to match individuals with other individuals or institutions or goods or services in such a way that their preferences are respected. In addition to foundational theory, he also works on implementing better policies in practice, building on academic insights. Examples include redesign of medical residency matching and nursery schools in Japan.
- “Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications” (2023), with Yuichiro Kamada, The Review of Economic Studies, rdad046.
- “Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation” (2023), with , Ning Sun and Ning Neil Yu, The Review of Economic Studies, rdad032.
- “Job Matching under Constraints” (2020), joint with Ning Sun and Ning Neil Yu, American Economic Review, 110, pp 2935–2947.
- “Stable Matching in Large Economies” (2019), with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim, Econometrica, 87-1, pp 65–110.
- “Efficient Matching Under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications” (2015), with Yuichiro Kamada, American Economic Review, 105, pp 67–99.
- “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Matching Markets” (2013), with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, pp 1585–1632.
- “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications” (2013), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom, American Economic Review, 103, pp 585–623.
- “Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms” (2010), with Yeon-Koo Che, Econometrica, 78, pp 1625–1672.
- “Axioms for Deferred Acceptance” (2010), with Mihai Manea, Econometrica, 78, pp 633–653.
- “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets” (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review, 99, pp 608–627.
Other Professional Activities and Awards
Other Professional Activities and Services
- Fellow of the Econometric Society (2021-present)
- Council Member of the Game Theory Society (2021-present)
- Member of the Council, Game Theory Society (2021-present)
- Editorial Board Member, American Economic Review (2021-present)
- Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics (2021-present)
- Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies (2021-present)
- Co-Editor, International Journal of Economic Theory (2018-present)
- Associate Editor, Japanese Economic Review (2015-present)
- Associate Editor, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design (2015-present)
- Associate Editor, Journal of Dynamics and Games (2015-present)
- VCASI Fellow (2008-present)
- 2021 Japanese Economic Association Nakahara Prize
- 2019 Japan Academy Academic Award
- 2018 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Prize
- 2018 Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize
- 2016 Social Choice and Welfare Prize
- 2013-2015 Sloan Research Fellow
- 2010 Inaugural Ken-ichi Miyazawa Memorial Award
- 2003 Ouchi Hyoe Award for the Best Undergraduate Thesis, University of Tokyo
- 2003 Presidential Award, University of Tokyo