MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi

MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi

Name / Position

MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi / Professor

Website

Personal WebsiteOpen a new window

E-mail

hitoshi@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Curriculum Vitae

Education

1988, March Ph.D. Economics. Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
1983, March B.A. Department of Economics, University of Tokyo

Professional Experience

2002, April Professor at Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
1994, April Associate Professor at Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
1992, April Associate Professor at College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba
1989, April Lecturer at College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba
1988, April Assistant Professor at College of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba

Research Field

Game Theory, Informational Economics, Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, Experimental Economics

Research Theme

My area of specialization is game theory. My past academic research about game theory, especially repeated games, implementation, and mechanism design, are well known to and highly valued by many worldwide professional researchers. With respect to repeated games, I have shown that efficiency is achievable by a non-cooperative equilibrium even if economic agents cannot observe other agents' activity choices very well. With respect to implementation and mechanism design, I have shown that we can design a public decision procedure according to which economic agents can always achieve an efficient and fair allocation as a unique non-cooperative equilibrium. My main research themes at the present are behavioral mechanism design, behavioral and ethical implementation, experimental economics, and game-theoretical foundation of blockchain ecosystems and smart contracts.

Publications

Articles (Refereed)

  • Partial Ex-Post Verifiability and Unique Implementation of Social Choice Functions, Social Choice and Welfare, October 8, 2020 (open access).
  • Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Joint with Yutaka Kayaba and Tomohisa Toyama), Games and Economic Behavior 120, 193-208, March 2020.
  • Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 20 (1), 2019
  • Implementation without Expected Utility: Ex-Post Verifiability, Social Choice and Welfare 53 (4), 575-585, 2019.
  • Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 20 (1), 2019.
  • Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 2019.
  • Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings, Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.
  • Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer's Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.
  • Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy, Japanese Economic Review 65 (1), 116-121, 2014.
  • Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation, Social Choice and Welfare 41 (4), 883-893, 2013.
  • Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes,　Journal of Economic Theory 148, 858-870, 2013.
  • Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Small Fines: The Penance Contract, Japanese Economic Review 63, 333-347, 2012.
  • Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November 2010 (joint with Koichi Miyazaki and Nobuyuki Yagi)
  • Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition, The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December 2010
  • Role of Honesty in Full Implementation, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March 2008
  • Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 134-151, July 2008
  • Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July 2008
  • Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March 2007
  • On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality, The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54, 2005
  • Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players, Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 823-852, 2004
  • Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May 2001
  • Private Observation, Communication and Collusion, Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May 1998 (joint with Michihiro Kandori)
  • Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View, The Japanese Economic Review, 48(3), 1997, also in Rational Choice Theory Vol. 5 (ed. by Allingham), Routledge, 2006
  • Exact Implementation, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October 1994 (joint with Dilip Abreu)
  • Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 107-121, February 1993.
  • A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information], Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November 1992 (joint with Dilip Abreu)
  • Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information, Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September 1992 (joint with Dilip Abreu), also in Recent Development in Game Theory (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics), ed. by E. Maskin, 1999, Edward Elgar, USA.
  • Efficiency in Partnerships, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 296-322, December 1991 (joint with Patrick Legros)
  • On the Theory of Repeated Games with Private Information : Part I: Anti-Folk Theorem without Communication, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 253-256, March 1991
  • Coalitionally Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Limited Public Information, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 371-375, December 1991
  • On the Theory of Repeated Games with Private Information: Part II: Revelation through Communication, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 257-261, March 1991
  • Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Full Transferability, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June 1991
  • Long-Term Partnership in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Random Matching, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 245-248, November 1990
  • Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information and with Public Information, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 109-112, October 1990
  • Contractual Delay and Efficiency in Delegation Games: Two-Principal Case, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 329-332, December 1990 (joint with Shinsuke Kambe)
  • Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 428-442, August 1989
  • A New Approach to the Implementation Problem, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June 1988

Articles - Working Papers (Selected)

  • Epistemological Mechanism Design (Joint with Shunya Noda), CARF-F-498, UTMD-F-001, November 2020.
  • Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (joint with Shunya Noda), CARF-F-474, CREPEDP-68, CIRJE-F-1145, KIER.Kyoto.DP.NO-1027. 2020.
  • Recurrent Preemption Games, CARF-F-472, CREPEDP-62, CIRJE-F-1143, KIER.Kyoto.DP.NO-1020. 2020.
  • Mechanism Design with General Ex-Ante Investments (Joint with Shunya Noda) CIRJE-F-1124, CARF-F-464, CREPEDP-58, 2019.
  • Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries, CARF-F-462, CREPEDP-57, CIRJE-F-1121, 2019.
  • Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance, CARF-F-459, CREPEDP-55, CIRJE-F-1119, 2019.
  • Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity, CARF-F-447, CREPDP-46, 2018.
  • Framing Game Theory,  CIRJE-F-1076, CARF-F-428, 2018.
  • Investment and Ultimatum Games: Experiments (joint with Toshihiko Shima) CIRJE-F-790, CARF-F-244, 2011.
  • Incentive in Hedge Funds CIRJE-F-714, 2010.
  • The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination, CIRJE-F-53, University of Tokyo, 1999
  • Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information (joint with Dilip Abreu), 1992.
  • Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information, Working Papers e-91-1, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1991 (joint with Dilip Abreu)

Other Professional Activities and Awards

Other Professional Activities and Services

  • Econometric Society Council (2007 ~ 2012, 2016 ~ 2019)
  • 2009 Far East and South Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society Program and Local Committee Chair (joint with Hidehiko Ichimura), August 2009, University of Tokyo.
  • Econometric Society Regional Standing Committee (voted) (2015 ~2020).
  • Japanese Economic Review Editor (May 2015 ~March 2018).

Awards

  • The Hyoue-Ouchi Award (University of Tokyo) 1983.
  • The Econometric Society Fellow (2003~)
  • The Nakahara Award (Japanese Economic Association) 2004