Japanese
MATSUSHIMA, Hitoshi
Publications
I) Recent Publications 2000.4 - Present
<Articles>
Interlinkage and Generous Tit-for-Tat Strategy, Japanese Economic Review 65 (1), 116-121, 2013
Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation, Social Choice and Welfare 41 (4), 883-893, 2013
Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes, Journal of Economic Theory 148, 858-870, 2013
Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Small Fines: The Penance Contract, Japanese Economic Review 63, 333-347, 2012
"Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information," Journal of Economic Theory 145(6), 2241-2259, 2010 (joint with Koichi Miyazaki and Nobuyuki Yagi)
"Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review 61(4), 443-454, 2010
"Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming
"Tit-For-Tat Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,"Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-492, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, April 2007
"Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," Journal of Economic Theory, 113 (1), March 2007 (Regular Article)
"Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents,"Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-419, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, April 2006
"Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-401, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, February 2006 (joint with Koichi Miyazaki and Nobuyuki Yagi)
"On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," Japanese Economic Review, 56 (1), March 2005, Nakahara Prize Lecture
"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players," Econometrica, 72(3), May 2004 (Regular Article)
"Multi-Group Incentives," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-201, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, March 2003
"Finitely Repeated Games with Small Side Payments," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-179, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, October 2002
"Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-149, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, April 2002
"A New Trend of the Study of Repeated Games: Implicit Collusion with Private Monitoring," H. Imai and A. Okada eds., New Frontiers of Game Theory, Keiso Shobou, March 2002 (in Japanese)
"Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-148, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, March 2002
"Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-147, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, February 2002
"Stable Implementation," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-128, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, August 2001
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, 98(1), May 2001
"Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships," Discussion Paper CIRJE-CF-98, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, December 2000
"Moral Decision and Information Aversion," G. Hatano, N. Okada and H. Tanabe eds., Affective Minds: A Collection of Lectures Presented at the 13th Toyota Conference, Elsevier Science B. V., June 2000

<Book Review>
K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds., Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1, Elsevier Science, 2002 (Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 175-210, 2004)
 
II) Publications 1995 - 2000.3
<Articles>
"Understanding Economy in Game Theory," Keizai Seminar, Nihon Hyoronsha, April 2000 (in Japanese)
"Moral Decision and Information Aversion," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-64, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, November 1999, forthcoming in G. Hatano, N. Okada and H. Tanabe eds., Affective Minds: A Collection of Lectures Presented at the 13th Toyota Conference, Elsevier Science B. V.
"New Paradigm with Information Processing Rules: Towards a Evolutionary Theory of Institution beyond the Selection Principle," K. Nakagane and Y. Miwa eds., Economics of Market, Yuhikaku, June 1999 (in Japanese)
"The Role of Mobility among Regions in Coordination," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-53, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, June 1999
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," (with D. Abreu), in E. Maskin ed., Recent Developments in Game Theory, The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 109, An Elgar Reference Collection, 1999, 117-132
"Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-24, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, October 1998, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
"Economic Psychics: From Rational Calculation to Dynamics of Emotion," Keizai Seminar, November 1998 (in Japanese)
"Efficient Entrepreneurship," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-13, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, July 1998
"Towards a Theory of Subjective Games," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-9, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, June 1998
"Learning about Stochastic Payoff Structure," Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-7, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, June 1998
"Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," (with M. Kandori), Econometrica, 66(3), 1998, 627-652
"Efficient Partnerships: Uncertainty and Inductive Learning," The Journal of Economics, 64(1), April 1998 (in Japanese)
"Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning: Towards a Theory of Subjective Games," Mita Gakkai-shi, 91, April 1998 (in Japanese)
"Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View," Japanese Economic Review, 48(3), 1997, 293-306,also in Rational Choice Theory Vol. 5 (ed. by Allingham), 2006
"Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's, View," in K. Nishimura ed., Trends of Modern Economics 1997, Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1997 (in Japanese)
"Procedural Rationality and Inductive Learning I : Towards a Theory of Subjective Games," Discussion Paper 97-F-21, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, June 1997
"Mechanism Design in Game theory: Uniqueness and Renegotiation-Proofness," The Journal of Economics, 62(1), April 1996 (in Japanese)
"Rationality in the A-M Mechanism," Keizai-Kenkyuu, 47(1) Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Iwanami Shoten, January 1996 (in Japanese)
"Game Theory Metamorphose: from Dr. Strangelove to Novel Prize", Keizai Seminar, Nihon Hyoronsha, January 1995 (in Japanese)
"Game Theory DIE-HARD: A Review of: Prisoner-Dilemma, by Poundstone," INTERCOMMUNICATION, 14, NTT Shuppan, 1995 (in Japanese)

<Book Review>
M. Nakayama A Review of: An Introduction to Game Theory, (Windows of Mr. Shosai, 471, Yuhikaku, 1998, in Japanese)
 
III) Selected Publications prior to 1995
<Articles>
"Exact Implementation," (with D. Abreu), Journal of Economic Theory, 64(1), October 1994, 1-19
"Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 59(1), February 1993, 107-121
"A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November 1992 (joint with Dilip Abreu)
"Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," (with D. Abreu), Econometrica, 60(5), September 1992, 993-1008, also in Recent Development in Game Theory (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics), ed. by E. Maskin, 1999, Edward Elgar, USA
"Efficiency in Partnerships," (with P. Legros), Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 55(2), December 1991, 296-322
"Coalitionally Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Limited Public Information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 37(4), December 1991, 371-375
"Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Full Transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 54(1), June 1991, 198-203
"On the Theory of Repeated Games with Private Information, Part II : Revelation through Communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 35(3), March 1991, 257-261
"On the Theory of Repeated Games with Private Information, Part I : Anti-Folk Theorem without Communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 35(3), March 1991, 253-256
"Contractual Delay and Efficiency in Delegation Games: Two-Principal Case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 34(4), December 1990, 329-332 (with S. Kambe)
Long-Term Partnership in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Random Matching," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 34(3), November 1990, 245-248
"Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information and with Public Information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, 34(2), October 1990, 109-112
"Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 48(2), August 1989, 428-442
"A New Approach to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 45(1), June 1988, 128-144
 
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